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context: cap TLS reads during zip import #7017
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Curious; why was this condition removed?
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Good question — this was intentional to fix a boundary detection gap with chunked reads.
The old early-return at
l.N == 0silently masks data beyond the limit asio.EOFwhen the underlying reader delivers data in chunks. This is realistic for zip decompression streams that don't deliver all bytes in a singleRead()call.The bug scenario:
The old code's
if l.N == 0 { return 0, io.EOF }tellsio.ReadAll"stream ended cleanly" when the underlying reader actually has more data beyond the limit. This is a security concern for the zip bomb fix — if a TLS entry decompresses to exactly 10MB in chunks, the old code returns EOF. If it's 10MB+1 byte delivered as (10MB chunk) + (1 byte chunk), the old code also returns EOF after reading 10MB, silently truncating without error.The new code removes that early return and probes the underlying reader at the zero-remaining boundary: when
Nreaches 0, the next read is capped to 1 byte (N+1). If the underlying reader returns data,Ngoes to -1 and we report the violation. If it returnsio.EOF, we propagate it cleanly.The regression test validates this — the "Tes" (3 bytes, N=2) case catches both implementations via the N+1 cap, but the chunked scenario is where the old code fails.